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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5639
This study estimates the causal effects of a public per-
student subsidy program targeted at low-cost private 
schools in Pakistan on student enrollment and schooling 
inputs. Program entry is ultimately conditional on 
achieving a minimum stipulated student pass rate (cutoff) 
in a standardized academic test. This mechanism for 
treatment assignment allows the application of regression-
discontinuity (RD) methods to estimate program impacts 
at the cutoff. Data on two rounds of entry test takers 
(phase 3 and phase 4) are used. Modeling the entry 
This paper is a product of the Education team, South Asia  Region; and the Education Team, Human Development 
Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at fbarrera@worldbank.org and draju2@worldbank.org.
process of phase-4 test takers as a sharp RD design, 
the authors find evidence of large positive impacts 
on the number of students, teachers, classrooms, and 
blackboards. Modeling the entry process of phase-3 test 
takers as a partially-fuzzy RD design given treatment 
crossovers, they do not find evidence of significant 
program impacts on outcomes of interest. The latter 
finding is likely due to weak identification arising from a 
small jump in the probability of treatment at the cutoff. 
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1.  Introduction  
School participation in Pakistan is generally low in absolute terms, relative to other countries in 
its region, and relative to developing countries at its level of per capita income. Given the present 
trend,  Pakistan  is  likely  to  fall  significantly  short  of  the  United  Nations’  Millennium 
Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. Thus, measures that produce sharp 
and sustained gains in participation are viewed as pressing by development policymakers and 
practitioners in the country.    
In  this  paper,  we  estimate  the  causal  effects  of  a  recently-instituted  public  subsidy 
program to low-cost private schools in the province of Punjab, Pakistan on school enrollment 
and inputs. Coined the Foundation Assisted Schools (FAS) program and administered by the 
Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), a semi-autonomous intermediary organization, the rationale 
behind the program is to leverage, essentially via public financing, the growing low-cost private 
school system in Punjab to increase equitable access to schooling more efficiently than can be 
achieved through the province’s public school system.  
Given  the  contracting  modality,  the  program  falls  under  the  rubric  of  public-private 
partnerships  (PPPs)  in  education,  a  set  of  interventions  which  is  increasingly  perceived  in 
international policy circles as a promising mechanism for attaining key education goals (World 
Bank 2009). In addition, opportunities for introducing PPP programs of medium to large scale 
are emerging in several developing countries (e.g., India, Kenya, and Nigeria) as the private 
education sector matures and becomes an important player in service delivery.  
The FAS program was initiated on a pilot basis in November 2005, and rapidly expanded 
in phases. As of September 2008, the program had completed four phases of expansion and 3 
 
covered 1,082 low-cost private schools (primary, middle, and secondary levels
1) with roughly 
474,000 students across 18  out of 35  districts in Punjab.  In the districts with the highest 
concentration of program schools, we estimate that the program covers approximately one-fifth 
of all private schools. The program offers a monthly per-student cash subsidy strictly tied to, 
among other things, free schooling for all enrolled children (thus, pricing program schools in line 
with public schools which are officially free) and a minimum student pass rate in a specially -
designed standardized academic test administered semi-annually by PEF. Program schools have 
free rein on how to spend the subsidy amount.
2 
To the best of our knowledge, credible evidence on the  impacts of public subsidies to 
private schools is limited.   The study by Kim et al.   (1999) is particularly pertinent as they 
evaluate a public subsidy program in Pakistan which shares some of the design elements of the 
FAS program. They study the impact of a program that offered a low temporary per-girl student 
subsidy conditional on free girls’ schooling to establish and operate private primary schools in a 
randomly-selected subset of poor urban neighborhoods lacking public girls’ primary schools in 
the  province  of  Balochistan.  Using  a  difference-in-differences  approach,  they  find  that  the 
program  substantially  increased  girls’  as  well  as  boys’  school  participation  in  treatment 
neighborhoods, and that these increases were obtained at lower costs than would have been 
possible through the public school system. For other well-identified evaluation studies of subsidy 
programs (as well as of other types of PPP interventions), see the recent review by World Bank 
(2009). 
                                                 
1 Primary schools are composed of grades 1–5. Middle schools are composed of grades 1–8 or 6–8. Secondary 
schools are composed of grades 1–10, 6–10, or 9–10.  
2 In contrast, the standard subsidy program is designed to directly fin ance educational inputs (Gauri and Vawda 
2003). 4 
 
Consistent with the objectives of the FAS program, we ask two questions in this study. 
(1) What is the causal effect of the program on the number of students in program schools? (2) 
What is the causal effect of the program on inputs, namely the number of teachers, classrooms, 
blackboards,  and  toilets,  and  on  student-teacher  and  student-classroom  ratios  in  program 
schools? To answer these questions, using school-level baseline and follow-up data on school 
characteristics  and  outcomes  obtained  from  program  administrative  records  and  telephone 
interviews of school administrators, we fit appropriate regression-discontinuity (RD) designs to 
the treatment assignment mechanism in order to obtain reliable nonexperimental estimates of 
program impacts. 
In the last two entry phases preceding this study, phases 3 and 4, a standardized academic 
test, called the Short Listing Quality Assurance Test (SLQAT), was administered by PEF as the 
final step in the program entry screening process. In order for schools to enter the program in 
these two phases, they had to apply to the program, pass a qualitative physical inspection, and 
then pass  the SLQAT.  If the school  achieves the  stipulated minimum student  pass  rate (the 
cutoff) in the SLQAT, then the school becomes eligible for the program, and not otherwise. 
Furthermore, in practice, virtually  all schools that become eligible  elect to participate in the 
program.  
At the time of the follow-up data collection in October 2008, as phase 4 was the last entry 
phase, schools that took the phase-4 SLQAT were either untreated or treated based on their 
SLQAT pass rate relative to the cutoff (i.e., the probability of treatment jumps from zero to one 
at the cutoff). This structure allows us to apply a sharp RD design to these data. On the other 
hand, schools that took the phase-3 SLQAT and failed found they had another opportunity to 
seek entry when phase 4 was announced—some phase-3 SLQAT ―failers‖ reapplied to phase 4, 5 
 
recleared the physical inspection, retook the SLQAT, and passed it. We find that the probability 
of treatment  for phase-3 SLQAT takers also  jumps  at  the cutoff but  by  less  than one. This 
structure allows us to apply a special case of a fuzzy RD design which accounts for what can be 
viewed as equivalent to noncompliance by initially-untreated schools.  
Given these designs, the effects of the program are identifiable and estimable. In the case 
of the sharp RD design, under some mild regularity conditions, the average causal effect of the 
treatment on the treated at the cutoff is identified. In the case of our fuzzy RD design, under the 
same regularity conditions, the average causal effect of the treatment on the untreated at the 
cutoff  is  identified.  Under  both  designs,  the  respective  treatment  effects  at  the  cutoff  are 
estimated nonparametrically using local linear regressions.  
Our findings on the impacts of the FAS program differ by phase. For phase-3 SLQAT 
takers, applying a partially-fuzzy RD design, we find no evidence of program impacts at the 
cutoff on our outcomes of interest. We posit that this is likely due to weak identification arising 
from a small jump in the probability of treatment at the cutoff. In contrast, for phase-4 SLQAT 
takers, applying a sharp RD design, we find robust evidence of positive program impacts at the 
cutoff on the number of students, teachers, classrooms, and blackboards. The program impacts 
were sizeable both in absolute terms as well as relative to the baseline means for these outcomes 
for phase-4 SLQAT takers near the cutoff: our most conservative estimates suggest that the 
program  expanded  schools  by  roughly  85  students,  and  3–4  teachers,  classrooms,  and 
blackboards, which translate into relative increases of 27–47%, depending on the outcome of 
interest.  These  impact  estimates  are  particularly  impressive  when  we  consider  that  phase-4 
program schools were exposed to only about ten months of treatment before the follow-up data 
were collected. Our cost-effectiveness  analysis suggests that the FAS program is among the 6 
 
cheapest interventions in developing countries for generating enrollment gains. Notwithstanding, 
the estimated impact on enrollment needs to be interpreted cautiously as, given our data, we are 
unable to establish the extent to which the enrollment gains translate into school participation 
gains given that, among other things, the elimination of school fees in program schools is likely 
to also attract students from non-program schools in the vicinity of program schools. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the education 
context in Pakistan at the time the FAS program was introduced. Section 3 describes the program 
in detail. Section 4 lays out our identification and estimation strategies. Section 5 describes the 
data and provides some summary statistics for SLQAT takers. Section 6 presents our impact and 
cost-effectiveness findings. Section 7 summarizes and interprets our main findings, as well as 
provides some concluding  comments. These comments  comprise of  a  discussion of  external 
validity  and  two  specific  potential  threats  to  internal  validity:  treatment  spillovers  to  non-
program  low-cost  private  schools  within  the  sphere  of  influence  of  program  schools,  and 
behavioral changes in non-program schools in anticipation of future program entry.  
 
2.  The education context 
The FAS program was conceived and introduced into an education landscape defined by three 
features. One: equitable access to schooling is an acute, persistent challenge. Two: the public 
sector,  which  remains  the  dominant  provider  of  education,  suffers  from  chronic  weaknesses 
which impair its ability to effectively address this challenge. Three: in the wake of this public 
sector failure, the private sector has aggressively stepped in in recent years, growing dramatically 
in size and reach, and now constitutes a major policy opportunity for addressing this challenge. 7 
 
The education situation of Pakistan is generally poor in absolute terms, relative to other 
countries in its region, and relative to developing countries at its level of per capita income (see, 
e.g.,  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization  2007  for  a  recent 
comparative picture). Given the present trend, Pakistan is unlikely to meet the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education by 2015. The education situation 
of  Punjab—Pakistan’s  most  prosperous  and  populous  province  and  the  site  for  the  FAS 
program—is by and large comparable to the rest of the country. As Panel A in Table 1 shows, 
estimates  using  household  sample  survey  data  from  2004/05,  which  is  just  before  the  FAS 
program was initiated, show that the participation rate in formal school (grade 1+) of children 
ages  6–15  years  was  65.7%,  with  a  significantly  lower  share  for  children  from  the  poorest 
(bottom expenditure quintile) households. 
The public school system has been hampered in its ability to improve education outcomes 
due to, in large part, the lack of effective accountability and incentive systems which promote the 
legitimate  and  efficient  use  of  allocated  resources  (Social  Policy  and  Development  Center 
2003).
3 While the public school system has struggled to enroll children and educate  them, the 
private school system has grown dramatically as reflected by the number of institutions and share 
of enrollment. In addition, responding to the broad demand for greater access and better quality, 
the system  has evolved in character, becoming less elite and more   egalitarian, increasingly 
                                                 
3 Recent evidence on relative teacher performance in private and public schools in Punjab suggests this. Andrabi et 
al. (2008a) find that, while public school teachers are on average significantly better paid and have higher levels of 
education, training, and experience than their counterparts in private schools, the teacher absenteeism rate is 15% in 
public schools compared to 8% in private schools. They also find that, whereas private school teacher salaries are 
increasing in teacher competency (as measured by teacher test scores) and decreasing in teacher absenteeism, public 
school teacher salaries do not exhibit similar correlation patterns and instead appear to be largely determined by 
teacher credentials (education, training, and experience). Looking at child education outcomes, Andrabi et al. find 
that private school teacher salaries are increasing in student test scores whereas public school teacher salaries are 
not.  The  responsiveness  of  private  school  teacher  salaries  to  these  key  behaviors  and  outcomes  suggests  the 
influence of market discipline which the public school system is not subject to, at least directly. 8 
 
reaching  low-income  and  rural  households.
4  Using  private  school  census  data from  2000, 
Andrabi et al. (2008b) find that there was an exponential increase in the number of private 
schools over the 1990s, with over 50% of existi ng private schools established in or after 1996. 
Furthermore, they find that while existing schools set up before 1990 were predominantly in 
urban areas, the distribution since then has become increasingly rural.  
In line with this increase in institutions, the share of enrollment in private school has also 
increased. As Panel B in  Table 1 shows, in 2004/05, 15.8% and 18.5% of children ages 6–15 
years  were  enrolled  in  private  schools  in  all-Pakistan  and  Punjab,  respectively;  these  shares 
represent significant increases from 1998/99. The increases were particularly dramatic in rural 
areas and for households in the poorest expenditure quintile. Similar evidence is provided by 
Andrabi et al. (2008b) who find that the growth rate in private school enrollment over the 1990s 
was highest among low-income households nationally, and among middle-income households in 
rural  areas,  whereas  the  growth  rate  in  public  school  enrollment  over  the  same  period  was 
negative in both urban and rural areas and across the household income distribution. They also 
find that fees in private schools are generally low: median annual fees per student in 2000 in 
Pakistan were 960 (US$23.4
5) and 751 rupees (US$18.3) in urban and rural areas, respectively, 
and account for a small percentage of  mean annual household expenditure. The corresponding 
statistics for Punjab were lower, at 828 rupees (US$20.2) and 600 rupees (US$14.6). 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 It is conceivable that much of the growth and metamorphosis in the private school system is in direct response to 
the rigidities and shortcomings in the public school system.  
5 The exchange rate in 2000 was 41 rupees per US dollar.  9 
 
3.  The Foundation Assisted Schools program
6 
Institutional background: The FAS program is administered by PEF, a publicly-funded semi-
autonomous statutory organization established in 1991 which serves as the main institutional 
mechanism for PPPs  in education in  Punjab.  The organization’s primary  aims  are to  enable 
socioeconomically-disadvantaged households to access private education and to raise the quality 
of education in low-cost private schools. To these ends, it employs an array of instruments such 
as  start-up  and  operational  subsidies,  vouchers  to  households  in  poor  localities,  school 
management and teacher training, and specialist teacher services to promote private education. 
The FAS program is PEF’s largest program. In fiscal year 2007–08, PEF spent 1.1 billion rupees 
(US$12.9  million
7)  on  FAS  program  benefits.
8  This  amount  accounted  for  61%  of  total 
expenditures by the organization in that year.  
Program coverage and timeline: The FAS program was initiated in November 2005 on a pilot 
basis in 54 schools in five districts in Punjab. Since then, PEF has expanded the program in 
phases to cover additional districts as well as more schools within program districts. (See Table 2 
for a timeline of the program highlighting the start-dates of each of the phases as well as the 
dates of other key events.) As of September 2008, the program has completed four entry phases 
(the pilot phase represents phase 1), and covers 1,082 private primary, middle, and secondary 
schools in 18 out of the 35 districts in Punjab.
9 Of these, 945 schools (87%) are located in just 
seven  districts (see  Table  3  for a district-  and phase-wise disaggregation of the  number  of 
program schools as well as Figure 1 for the location of program districts in Punjab). This number 
                                                 
6 The information on the program presented in the paper reflects program design and administration until end 2008.  
7 In this and following sections, the exchange rate used for the conversions is  85 rupees per US dollar (effective 
March 2011). When the program was introduced in 2005, the exchange rate was roughly 60 rupees per US dollar; 
the rupee has steadily weakened since then.   
8 FAS program administrative costs are unavailable as PEF does not disaggregate administrative costs by program. 
We however know that total administrative costs were less than 1% of total expenditures in fiscal year 2007 –08, 
suggesting that FAS program administrative costs are negligible relative to current FAS program benefit outlays.  
9 The FAS program also currently covers three higher secondary schools (schools with grades 11–12).  10 
 
of program schools represents a significant share of all private schools in these seven districts: 
using the 2005 National Education Census (NEC), a census of schools in Pakistan, we estimate 
that the program covers 21% of private schools in these districts (see Table 4).
10  
Program location: The program was initially designed to be targeted at districts ranked lowest in 
terms  of  adult  literacy  rates  based  on  2003/04  Multiple  Indicators  Cluster  Survey  data 
(Government  of Punjab 2004). However, in  phases  1 and 2, this  targeting decision was  not 
applied as PEF was limited in its institutional and logistical capacity at that time to effectively 
administer the program in poorly-ranked districts that had physical environmental challenges and 
limited transportation and accommodation options (Malik 2007). In contrast, in phases 3 and 4, 
the targeting decision was effectively applied. Consequently, as Table 3 shows, 51% and 89% of 
program schools are located in districts ranked among the bottom-quarter and bottom-half in 
terms of adult literacy rates, respectively. 
Program school characteristics: Table 5 presents the distribution of program schools by selected 
characteristics measured in September 2008. Aggregating the phases together (Column 5), the 
mean school size is 351 students. The majority of schools are middle level (59%), coeducational 
(83%), registered with local government authorities (87%), and rural (55%). Disaggregating by 
phase (Columns 1–4), the distribution of program schools by these characteristics is roughly 
comparable except for the level of the school: in contrast to the pattern in the aggregate sample, 
program  schools  that  entered  in  phases  1  and  2  were  mainly  secondary  schools  (65–73%). 
School size also appears to be monotonically decreasing with phase; the mean size of program 
schools which entered in phase 1 is 561 students, whereas that of program schools which entered 
                                                 
10 NEC’s coverage of private schools might be incomplete. According to the survey documentation, private schools 
were identified in the field by interviewers with the assistance of local officials. It is conceivable that private schools 
that are, for example, unregistered or very small, or operate in obscure locations are more likely to be missed by 
interviewers. Thus, the estimate of 21% can be considered as an upper-end estimate of FAS program coverage of 
private schools.  11 
 
in  phase  4  is  242  students.  While  there  may  be  multiple  (competing)  explanations  for  this 
pattern, length of exposure to the program is among them.   
Program  benefits:  The  main  program  benefit  is  an  enrollment-related  subsidy:  the  school 
receives a monthly per-student cash subsidy amount of 300 rupees (US$3.5) up to a maximum of 
750 students (i.e., the total amount is capped at 225,000 rupees or US$2,647).
11 Given a mean 
school size of 215 students in phase-3 and phase-4 program schools at the time of application to 
the program, the mean monthly subsidy payment is roughly 64,500 rupees (US$759) at program 
entry. Enrollment information for  determining the subsidy amounts is submitted by program 
schools  to PEF  on a monthly basis using standardized reporting forms; if enrollment  has 
increased by 50 students or more over one month, PEF visits the school to verify the information 
before raising the subsidy amount.  PEF indicates that, when schools report large changes in 
enrollment, these reports tend to be at the start of the academic year in April.  
PEF reports that the subsidy level was  set low for two reasons. First, it  confines the 
attractiveness  of  the  program  to  low -cost  private  schools.  Second,  it  raise s  the  political 
palatability of the program as the per-student subsidy amount is less than half of the estimated 
per-student expenditure in the public school system  at the time the program was introduced .
12 
The subsidy benefit is paid for all twelve months of the year.  To facilitate timely and regular 
payments, starting in August 2007, the benefit amounts have been transferred  electronically to 
the bank accounts of program schools. 
                                                 
11 The program also offers two cash bonus benefits. The first is a teacher bonus for a high level of school test 
performance: once every academic year, a maximum of five teachers in each program school where at least 90% of 
students in tested classes obtain a score of 40% or higher in the QAT receive an award of 10,000 rupees (US$118) 
each. The second is a competitive school bonus for top school test performance: once every academic year, the 
program school in each of the seven main program districts which has the highest share of students with a score of 
40% or higher in the QAT is awarded 50,000 rupees (US$588). 
12 The exact subsidy amount was heavily guided by a survey conducted by PEF in 2005 in selected districts which 
showed that the vast majority of private schools that operate in rural areas and disadvantaged urban neighborhoods 
charge between 50–400 rupees per month (US$0.6–4.7) in fees. Based on this information, the subsidy amount was 
set at the upper-segment of this price range (Malik 2007). 12 
 
Initial benefit eligibility rules: School entry into the program follows a three-step process. In step 
1,  schools  apply  to  the  program  when  PEF  issues  a  call  for  applications  in  newspapers. 
Application eligibility is restricted to existing private primary, middle, and secondary schools 
with a minimum enrollment of 100 students from the districts listed in the call. Except in a few 
cases, only schools that submit properly filled-in applications by the announced deadline are 
considered for step 2. 
In step 2, PEF inspection teams visit schools unannounced to verify the data provided in 
the applications as well as assess the local reputation of the school and the quality of the physical 
infrastructure and schooling environment. PEF provides a points and weighting scheme to its 
inspection  teams—this  scheme  primarily  helps  ensure  that  the  same  school  attributes  are 
considered across schools and by different inspection teams. However, the screening exercise is 
largely  subjective:  whether  a  school  qualifies  for  step  3  depends  principally  on  qualitative 
impressions gathered by the inspection team on a given set of indicators. 
In step 3, which was introduced starting with phase 3, all students present in selected 
grades in the school on the day of the physical inspection screening are offered a 55-minute, 
written, curriculum-based test called the Short Listing Quality Assurance Test (SLQAT).
13 The 
SLQAT is  a  pared-down version  of the  Quality  Assurance Test ( QAT)  which is used to 
determine  continuing  benefit  eligibility once schools enter the  program. The SLQAT tests 
knowledge and comprehension in three subjects: English, Urdu, and mathematics. It is designed 
by the testing department of PEF, the Academic Development Unit (ADU). Each school is tested 
on its own premises. Depending on the level of the school, two to three grades among grades 3, 
4, 6, 7, and 9 are tested. Which grades are tested in a given school are not disclosed in advance 
and are randomly selected by  ADU. Furthermore, multiple test papers a re prepared for each 
                                                 
13 For schools that entered the program in phases 1 and 2, step 2 was the final entry step.  13 
 
grade;  ADU randomly  selects  which specific test  papers  are offered in a  given school. The 
SLQAT  is  transported  in  sealed  envelopes  and  opened  only  in  the  presence  of  the  school 
administrator and teachers. At that time, both the PEF inspection team and the school learn 
which grades are selected for the SLQAT. Test invigilation is coordinated by the ADU member 
assigned  to  the  PEF  inspection  team.  The  completed  tests  are  transported  back  to  PEF 
headquarters  and  graded  by  ADU.  The  school  passes  the  SLQAT  if  at  least  67%  of  tested 
students score 33% or higher.  
Figure 2 presents the numbers of schools which passed each step of the program entry 
process. Out of the 1,070 and 1,430 schools that had submitted properly filled-in applications 
and were inspected in phases 3 and 4, respectively, 799 (75%) and 872 (61%) schools were 
offered the SLQAT. Of the schools that were offered the SLQAT, 514 (64%) and 431 (49%) 
schools achieved the minimum pass rate and became eligible for the program.
14 In terms of 
program take-up, PEF reports that 482  (94%) and 425 (98%) of the  schools that passed the 
SLQAT in phases 3 and 4 respectively signed the formal program participation agreement. 
Continuing  benefit  eligibility  rules:  The  program  participation  agreement  stipulates  several 
conditions for maintaining benefit eligibility. The conditions that are stringently applied by PEF 
are (1) schooling is offered to students without charging them any fees (and displaying the free-
schooling  status  prominently  on  a  PEF-issued  signboard  outside  the  school  gate)  and  (2) 
participation of the program school in the QAT and that at least 67% of the tested students score 
40%  or  higher  on  the  QAT.  A  one-time  violation  of  these  conditions  typically  results  in  a 
warning and the capping of enrollment figures  for the subsidy payment  until the next  QAT 
round. A second violation results in the permanent disqualification of the school with immediate 
                                                 
14 Our own tallies based on the SLQAT data deviate slightly from the above numbers: we find that 796 and 856 
schools took the SLQAT and, out of these, 511 and 432 schools achieved the minimum pass rate in phases 3 and 4, 
respectively. 14 
 
effect.  With  the  QAT-related  condition,  the  school  is  permanently  disqualified  if  it  fails  to 
achieve the minimum pass rate in the QAT in two consecutive attempts. 
The  QAT  is  a  65-minute,  written,  curriculum-based  test  designed  by  ADU,  and 
administered twice a year in October–November (in the first term) and February–March (in the 
second  term).  It  tests  knowledge,  comprehension,  application,  analysis,  and  synthesis.  The 
subject areas covered in the tests are English, Urdu, mathematics, and science (general science in 
grades 1–8 and biology, chemistry, and physics separately in grades 9–10). The general test 
administration procedures previously delineated with respect to the SLQAT are also followed 
with the QAT.
15 By the time of the follow-up data collection, PEF had conducted five QATs (see 
Table 2 for the dates).  Phase-3 program schools had been subject to two QATs and phase -4 
program schools one.  
There are also other conditions for maintaining b enefit eligibility. These include (1) 
registering the school with the District Registration Authority within one year of joining the 
program; (2) conducting only one class in a classroom in any period; (3) maintaining or 
upgrading the quality of the school ’s physical infrastructure (e.g., adequate classroom space, 
properly-constructed  rooms  and  buildings,  sufficient  ventilation,  and  sufficient  artificial  and 
natural light); (4) acquiring and maintaining adequate furniture and teaching tools (e.g., benches, 
desks, and blackboards); (5) providing monthly reports to PEF on enrollment counts; (6) keeping 
student-teacher  and  student-classroom  ratios  below  35:1;  (7)  keeping  enrollment  above  100 
students;  and  (8)  not  holding  after-hours  classes  or  tutoring  services  at  the  school.  These 
additional conditions are applied more leniently; typically, when PEF detects a violation among 
this subset of conditions, schools are provided with a warning and a grace period within which to 
                                                 
15 One important difference is that, unlike with the SLQAT, the school receives formal advance notices of the date 
of the QAT, and at least 80% of its students are expected to be in school on the day of the test. 15 
 
comply. As of the follow-up data collection, no program schools have been disqualified for 
repeated violations of these conditions. 
Table 6 presents the number of program schools that were disqualified, disaggregated by 
phase. The data are up until the time of the follow-up data collection. The number of schools that 
have been disqualified for any reason is negligible: only 28 out of the 1,111 program entrants 
(2.5%)  have  exited  the  program  over  time.  In  addition,  in  most  cases,  the  reason  for 
disqualification  is  two  consecutive  failures  to  achieve  the  minimum  pass  rate  on  the  QAT. 
Importantly, for our analysis, only three schools that entered the program in phases 3 and 4 have 
exited the program for any reason.
16 Thus, program dropout has not been an issue with phase-3 
and phase-4 program schools. 
Direct impact channels: The structure of the program can be expected to have a positive effect 
on enrollment via several direct channels. For example, setting the monthly subsidy as a linear 
function of the number of children enrolled incentivizes program schools to draw in additional 
students. Tying the receipt of program benefits to the elimination of school fees—which puts the 
program school’s price at an advantage over other local non-program competitor private schools 
and  at  par  with  public  schools—is  likely  to  raise  the  attractiveness  of  program  schools, 
particularly among households for which school fees serves as a major constraint to sending their 
children to private school.
17 
The structure of the program can also be expected to directly affect  investments in the 
quantity and quality of sch ool inputs and resources .  For example, increases in enrollment 
                                                 
16 PEF reports that the three schools were problematical cases from the outset; the schools were ejected from the 
program for general noncompliance and nonperformance. 
17 An increase in enrollment in program schools may not translate into a commensurate increase in participation 
among children in areas where program schools operate. The lower price of schooling in program schools is likely to 
induce both displacement and diversion effects: some share of the new enrollment in the program school will likely 
come  from  students  already  enrolled  in  other  schoo ls  or  children  that  where  initially  considering  enrolling 
elsewhere.  16 
 
induced by the per-student subsidy have to be met by increases in the number of classrooms and 
teachers if the stipulated maximum student-teacher and student-classroom ratio conditions are to 
be complied with. The maximum ratios encourage program entrants with preexisting ratios in 
excess  of  the  maximums  to  invest  in  additional  classrooms  and  teachers.  The  physical 
infrastructure and learning environment quality conditions encourage program schools to ensure 
the proper design and construction of infrastructural expansions, and to invest in teaching tools 
(e.g., blackboards) and basic facilities (e.g., toilets), in step with enrollment growth. These input-
related conditions encourage schools to schedule investments in school inputs and resources to 
either lead or accompany enrollment increases. However, given that these conditions are not 
stringently  applied,  it  suggests  that  PEF  might  tolerate  investments  in  school  inputs  and 
resources that lag enrollment increases, although reportedly not by too long. 
 
4.  Empirical strategy 
Identification 
Following the exposition in van der Klaauw (2008) and Todd (2007), let  i y  denote the outcome 
of interest (e.g., enrollment) in school i, and let the indicator variable    1 , 0  i d  denote treatment 
assignment, where one denotes that the school is covered by the FAS program (treated), and zero 
if not (untreated). In addition, let  i y0  and  i y1  denote the potential outcomes of school  i  in the 
untreated and treated states, respectively. The actual outcome observed for school i  is given by  
      1 0 0 1 0 0 1, i i i i i i i i i i i i y d y d y y y y d y d            (1) 
where  i  denotes the treatment effect for school i. 17 
 
Unless  treatment  is  randomly  assigned,  simply  comparing  mean  outcomes  of  treated 
schools  and  untreated  schools,      10 | 1 | 0 i i i i E y d E y d    ,  would  not  yield  an  unbiased 
estimate of the average causal effect of the treatment:   i E  . In general,  
              1 0 0 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 . i i i i i i i i i i E y d E y d E d E y d E y d             (2) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (2) is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
and the second term (in braces) is the selection bias arising from differences in potential average 
untreated outcomes between treated and untreated schools. Selection is clearly plausible in our 
case. For example, if, ex ante, program schools have higher levels and better quality inputs and 
resources  relative  to  non-program  schools,  then  the  selection  bias  term  will  be  positive  and 
generate an upward bias in our estimate of the ATT.  
The potential selection bias problem can however be overcome by using the institutional 
feature that program eligibility is ultimately determined by the student pass rate obtained by the 
school in the SLQAT relative to the known pass rate cutoff of 67%. Given that virtually all 
schools  that  become  eligible  to  participate  in  the  program  also  choose  to  participate  in  the 
program,  in  practice,  the  cutoff  determines  actual  program  participation.  Thus,  program 
participation status is assigned based on the decision rule 
      1, i i i d z z c    (3) 
where  i z  denotes school i’s pass rate which is perfectly observed (z will be more generally 
referred to as the assignment variable), c the known distinct cutoff pass rate, and    1  an indicator 
function. This design for treatment assignment based on a completely deterministic function is 
referred to as a sharp regression-discontinuity (RD) design.  18 
 
The SLQAT pass rate z might be correlated with our outcomes of interest. Thus, the 
treatment assignment mechanism is clearly not random and comparing schools that receive the 
treatment (   1  i i z d ) to schools that do not (   0  i i z d ) will yield a biased estimate of the ATT. 
If, however, we consider schools with  pass  rates near the cutoff to  be comparable, then the 
treatment assignment mechanism in the neighborhood of the cutoff can be viewed as if it was 
―almost random‖.  
More formally, let  0  e denote an arbitrarily small number. Comparing the outcomes of 
schools with pass rates just below the cutoff (marginal failers) with the outcomes of schools with 
pass rates at or just above the cutoff (marginal passers), yields 
            1 0 0 0 | | | | | . i i i i i i i i i i E y z c e E y z c e E z c e E y z c e E y z c e                (4) 
 Under the assumptions that (1) the limit    e c z y E i i e  
 | lim 0 0  is well defined; (2)    c z y E i i  | 0  
is continuous in the assignment variable  z at the cutoff (i.e., the conditional expectations of the 
outcome variable exhibits local smoothness at the cutoff in the absence of the treatment); and (3) 
the  density  of  the  assignment  variable  z  is  positive  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  cutoff,  the 
difference in the mean outcomes between marginal passers and marginal failers identifies 
        10 00 | lim | lim | . i i i i i i ee E z c E y z c e E y z c e 
          (5) 
This object is interpreted as the ATT at the cutoff (Hahn et al. 2001; Todd 2007). 
A  sharp  RD  design  neatly  fits  the  phase-4  SLQAT  taker  data,  as  the  school’s  pass 
(eligibility) versus fail (ineligibility) status remains fixed given that phase 4 was the last entry 
phase before the follow-up data collection. A variant of the above framework will however be 
required for phase-3 SLQAT takers given that some phase-3 failers reapplied to the program in 
phase 4 and passed the SLQAT at that time. As a result, our set of phase-3 SLQAT takers can be 19 
 
divided into three distinct subsets: (1) phase-3 failers who did not enter the program any time 
later; (2) phase-3 failers who entered the program later in phase 4 (crossover schools); and (3) 
phase-3 passers who entered the program at that time (as noted before, the treatment take-up rate 
by passers was virtually 100%, and there have been no dropouts to date). While the pass rate 
cutoff rule strictly determines program eligibility status for phase-3 SLQAT takers, the processes 
and factors behind the phase-4 application decision of phase-3 failers are unobservable to us and 
likely to be nonrandom. Given this, the eventual participation status of this group of schools is 
also considered to be driven partly by selection on unobservables.  
In our data, we find that the probability of program participation as a function of the pass 
rate in the phase-3 SLQAT,     i i i i z d z d E | 1 Pr |   , consists of a positive but smaller jump than 
one at  the cutoff. The  probability of program  participation will still be discontinuous  in  the 
assignment variable z at the cutoff. This feature implies that the phase-3 SLQAT taker data are 
more appropriately fitted with a fuzzy RD design. Under this design, apart from the identifying 
assumptions  for  the  sharp  design,  if  we  assume  that  treatment  i d   is  nondecreasing  in  the 
assignment  variable  z  at  the  cutoff  (local  monotonicity)  and  that  potential  outcomes  are 
independent of treatment conditional on the assignment variable z at the cutoff (local conditional 
independence), then the average causal effect of the treatment is identified by 
   
   
   
10 00
10 00
lim | lim |
|,
lim | lim |
i i i i ee
ii
i i i i ee
y z c e y z c e
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d z c e d z c e

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    

    
  (6) 
where the denominator of (6) is nonzero given the discontinuity in the probability of treatment at 
the cutoff (Hahn et al. 2001; Todd 2007). 
This treatment parameter represents the RD analog to the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Angrist et al. 1996). It can be interpreted as the average 20 
 
treatment  effect  for  schools  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  cutoff  who  are  induced  to  take  up 
treatment when their pass rates are at or above the cutoff      1  i i z d  but not so when they are 
below      0  i i z d . 
The general fuzzy design setup above allows for partial (or imperfect) compliance for 
both  treatment-eligible  and  treatment-ineligible  groups;  that  is,  it  allows  for  both  crossovers 
(treatment-ineligibles  taking  up  treatment)  and  no-shows  (treatment-eligibles  not  taking  up 
treatment)  (Bloom  1984).  In  our  case,  the  problem  is  essentially  one  of  one-way  partial 
compliance:  we  have  the  equivalent  of  crossovers  over  time  from  treatment-ineligible  to 
treatment-eligible  status,  with  all  treatment-eligible  schools  choosing  to  take  up  treatment. 
Hence, the probability of program participation for phase-3 SLQAT passers is one, while the 
probability for failers lies between zero and one.  
Battistin and Rettore (2008) describe the other one-way partial compliance case, where 
treatment-ineligible agents are not exposed to treatment and treatment-eligible agents self-select 
into treatment. They formally show that the LATE at the cutoff can be identified simply under 
the conditions required for identifying the ATT at the cutoff under the sharp RD design, thus 
labeling their framework as a ―partially‖ fuzzy RD design. Their framework straightforwardly 
applies to our case of one-way partial compliance as well. However, whereas in their specific 
setup, they identify the ATT at the cutoff (   e c z E i i e  
 | lim
0  ), by applying the smoothness 
condition to obtain the counterfactual average outcome for the untreated (   e c z y E i i e  
 | lim 1 0 ), 
we instead  identify the average treatment effect on the  untreated  (   e c z E i i e  
 | lim
0  ),  by 
applying the smoothness condition to obtain the counterfactual average outcome for the treated (
  0 0 lim | ii e E y z c e
  ) (Duflo et al. 2007).  21 
 
 
Estimation 
Choice of estimator: Given that we are interested in estimating the treatment effects at a single 
point using observations in its neighborhood, one suitable approach is local smoothing using 
nonparametric regression. Following Hahn et al. (2001), we opt for local linear regression (a 
local polynomial of order one). In the case of the sharp RD design, which applies to our phase-4 
SLQAT  takers,  the  application  of  local  linear  estimation  entails  individually  estimating  the 
conditional expectations of the outcome y at the cutoff from below (denoted by 

y  ˆ ) and above 
the cutoff (denoted by 

y  ˆ ) and then subtracting the two estimates. Under the sharp RD design, a 
consistent estimate of the ATT at the cutoff is given by  
  ˆ ˆ ˆ . y y y   
   (7) 
In  the  case  of  the  fuzzy RD design,  the  application  of  local  linear  regression entails 
estimating the ratio of two differences. Given our particular problem related to phase-3 SLQAT 
takers, we individually estimate the conditional expectations of the outcome y at the cutoff c 
from above and below (

y  ˆ  and 

y  ˆ , respectively), and the conditional expectation of treatment 
d from below only (denoted by  ˆd 
). Note that the conditional expectation of treatment  d from 
above is one by definition. Under our particular partially-fuzzy RD design, a consistent estimate 
of the LATE at the cutoff is given by 
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  (8) 22 
 
To perform statistical inference, empirical standard errors for (7) and (8) are obtained 
using the standard i.i.d. nonparametric bootstrap with paired sampling    i i z y , , resampling from 
the original data 500 times. 
Choice  of  kernel  and  bandwidth:  Implementation  of  local  linear  estimation  requires  the 
specification of the kernel k, the weighting function, and bandwidth  0 h  , the window width in 
which the kernel function is applied. We opt for the triangular kernel given that it is boundary 
optimal and thus well suited to RD problems (Cheng et al. 1997).
18  
The choice of bandwidth  is a relatively more  important decision  given the  trade-off 
between estimation bias and variance. Consensus in the literature on valid and robust  methods 
for bandwidth selection for  RD  problems is  lacking.
19  Given  this, we  discount  the specific 
method used to select the optimal bandwidth and instead emphasize checking the robustness of 
our findings to reasonable deviations in bandwidth from the optimal bandwidth choice. 
To select the optimal bandwidth, we rely on the default bandwidth choice in Nichols’ 
(2007) rd program for Stata which assigns positive weight to at least 30 observations on each 
side  of  the  cutoff,  and  applies  the  same  bandwidth  for  the  local  linear  estimators  of  the 
conditional mean outcomes (and probabilities of treatment) above and below the cutoff (i.e., 
h h h  
  ). In our case, the default choice translates to a bandwidth of three or four percentage 
points  for our RD impact estimations .  We believe that this  is a conservative choice , and 
                                                 
18 As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) note, while more sophisticated kernels are available, they do not provide any 
significant gain in asymptotic bias reduction. Furthermore, they note that, in general, parameter estimates appear to 
be robust to the choice of kernel. 
19  This is, in  large  part, due to two reasons. First, standard automated procedures for bandwidth selection for 
nonparametric regression have been developed with the estimation of functions at interior points in mind; the nature 
of the trade-off between bias and variance at interior points may differ from the nature of the trade -off at boundary 
points (Ludwig and Miller 2005). Second, the literature on the development of bandwidth se lectors customized to 
the  RD  context is an emergent  one (e.g.,  McCrary and Royer 2006 ; Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman 2009). In addition, the relative finite sample performances of the proposed bandwidth selection 
methods for RD designs have yet to be rigorously assessed.  
 23 
 
acceptably  balances  restricting  estimation  to  a  local  neighborhood  around  the  cutoff  against 
having  sufficient  statistical  power  to  yield  informative  estimates  of  treatment  effects. 
Notwithstanding, we examine whether our RD impact estimates and statistical inference results 
are sensitive to increasing the optimal bandwidth by 50% and 100%, potentially trading off 
increased bias for reduced variance. 
 
5.  Data and sample 
Data 
Baseline data: The baseline data come from the program application records and SLQAT test 
records  collected  and  maintained  by  PEF.  In  phase  3,  properly  filled-in  application  forms 
received by PEF before the announced deadline of April 2007, as well as forms filled out by 
schools  solicited  by  PEF  inspection  teams  on  their  way  to  inspect  applicant  schools  were 
considered. In phase 4, only properly filled-in forms received by PEF before the announced 
deadline  of  July  2007  were  considered.  PEF  collected  1,070  and  1,430  properly  filled-in 
application forms in phases 3 and 4, respectively.
20 
PEF constructed  a school-level application  electronic  database  for each phase  which 
contains  information  on  school  characteristics  (location,  gender  type,  level,   physical 
infrastructure, and registration status), total school enrollment separately by gender, total number 
of  teachers and administrative staff separately by gender, and the minimum and maximum 
monthly teacher salaries in the school.
21 These databases serve as the source of baseline data on 
the following outcomes measured at the school-level: number of students, teachers, classrooms, 
                                                 
20 The total number of unique applications received by PEF is unknown as all rejected applications were discarded.  
21 As part of this inspection, the data provided by the school in the application form are verified. Thes e inspection 
data would have been useful for checking the accuracy of the application data; they were however collected in paper 
form and not entered into an electronic database. Consequently, these data are unavailable for the purposes of this 
study. 24 
 
blackboards, and toilets. The school-level outcomes of student-teacher and student-classroom 
ratios are constructed by us using the data on total number of students, teachers, and classrooms. 
These databases also serve as the source of baseline data on school-level covariates, namely 
location, gender type, level, and registration status.  
The SLQAT serves as the source of data on the school’s student pass rate, our treatment 
assignment variable z. Separate electronic databases have been constructed by PEF for phase-3 
and phase-4 SLQAT takers. These databases contain the total score for each student that took the 
test. In the databases, student test scores are organized by school and, within school, by grade. 
The school identification information provided in the databases comprise of the school’s name 
(at  times,  with  some  address  elements)  and  location  (tehsil
22  and  district).  Although  PEF 
constructed the SLQAT pass rate for each school, we used the student test score data in order to 
construct  our  own  measure  of  school  SLQAT  pass  rates .  The  match  rate  between  their 
calculation of school SLQAT pass rates and ours ’ in both phases is nearly perfect at 99.5%. 
While it makes virtually no difference, we use our measure of school SLQAT pass rates as the 
treatment assignment variable  
Constructing a single electronic database for our analysis required that the application 
data are linked with the SLQAT data at the school level. Unfortunately, the same unique school 
identification variable was not used across databases. Consequently, we linked the application 
databases to the SLQAT databases using an iterative visual-matching process. First, schools were 
matched across databases using the district name and school name variables.
23 Exact matching 
failed in a number of cases as PEF did not maintain consistency in the spelling, word ordering, 
                                                 
22 Tehsil is the spatial unit of government administration one tier below district. There are 127 tehsils in Punjab. 
23 Although information on the school’s tehsil was also available in both the application and test databases, this 
information  was  error-ridden.  Consequently,  we  did  not  use  this  information  in  the  cross-database  matching 
exercise.  25 
 
and completeness of the school’s name across the two databases; hence, matching on school 
name  frequently  required  matching  on  key  words  and  word  patterns.  In  cases  where  we 
suspected that the combination of district name and school name (even with keyword and word 
pattern matching) did not yield a unique school record in a database, where possible, the set of 
matching variables was extended to include school address. This extension helped resolved a 
number of cases where we were tentative. On the basis of this exercise, 94% and 97% of school 
records in the SLQAT databases were linked with school records in the application databases for 
phases 3 and 4, respectively. Only the linked school records are used in our analysis, which yield 
sample sizes of 747 and 830 schools in phases 3 and 4, respectively. We refer to these samples as 
the SLQAT samples. 
Follow-up  telephone  interview  data:  We  collected  follow-up  outcome  data  via  telephone  in 
October  2008  from  phase-3  and  phase-4  schools  with  SLQAT  pass  rates  between    /   15 
percentage points of the cutoff. This information was gathered by a small team of independent 
interviewers. We  were  able  to collect  the  data  using  this  mode  as schools  were  required  to 
provide the telephone number of the school owner or administrator when they applied to the 
program, and the information was included in the school application electronic databases for 
both phases.  
We  obtained  data  on  the  following  outcomes:  the  number  of  students,  teachers, 
classrooms, blackboards, and toilets (the data on the last two outcomes were collected only for 
the phase-4 schools).
 24 We also obtained information on the program participation status of the 
schools,  and  crosschecked  this  information  against  PEF’s  records  of  program  schools  as  of 
September 2008. The school sample sizes within the selected pass rate range from the cutoff are 
                                                 
24 We are unable to speculate on the accuracy of these data vis-à-vis the same data collected through, for example, 
face-to-face interviews in the field, as we are unclear what context factors might lead to differences in accuracy 
across survey modes.  26 
 
268 and 319 schools in phases 3 and 4, respectively. These numbers constitute 36% and 38% of 
the respective SLQAT samples. We refer to these samples as the cutoff neighborhood samples.  
The period of the follow-up data collection was roughly 14 and 10 months after the 
receipt of the first subsidy payment by phase-3 and phase-4 program schools, respectively. The 
treatment exposure period under investigation roughly covers the second half of the 2007/08 
academic year and first half of the 2008/09 academic year. 
Unit nonresponse analysis: Despite repeated attempts by the interviewers, not all schools in the 
cutoff  neighborhood  samples  were  contactable  over  the  telephone.  Unit  nonresponses  were 
mainly due to wrong numbers or unattended telephone calls; when reached, refusals were rare. 
There were no cases of item nonresponse. Roughly 28% and 22% of schools have missing data 
due to unit nonresponse in the phase-3 and phase-4 cutoff neighborhood samples, respectively. 
These large percentages are expected to reduce the study’s statistical power (which does pose 
some  concern  given  that  our  study  is  low-powered  to  begin  with)  but  do  not  necessarily 
introduce sample selection bias.  
To investigate the presence of systematic bias, we estimate simple bivariate correlations 
between unit nonresponse and selected covariates, separately by phase. The covariates that we 
examine  comprise  of  indicator  variables  for  (initial)  treatment  assignment  (i.e.,  whether  the 
school’s SLQAT pass rate is above the cutoff) as well as baseline measures of the school’s 
registration status, level, gender type, and location. Table 7 presents nonresponse counts and 
rates  (Panel  A)  and  the  estimated  correlations  (Panel  B).  It  appears  that  the  probability  of 
nonresponse is not significantly associated with treatment assignment: the estimated correlation 
coefficients are .03 and .07 and the associated standard errors are .06 and .05 for the phase-3 and 
phase-4 cutoff neighborhood samples, respectively. In addition, as Columns 3 and 6 in the table 27 
 
show,  barring  a  few  exceptions—which  could  arise  simply  due  to  random  chance—the 
probability of nonresponse does not appear to be significantly associated with the selected school 
covariates.  Thus,  the  evidence  suggests  that  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that 
nonresponse rates are generally comparable for marginal failers and marginal passers across the 
selected dimensions measured at baseline.  
Even if nonresponse rates are similar between  marginal failers and passers, it is still 
possible that the selection process for nonresponding marginal failers differs from the selection 
process for nonresponding marginal passers (Duflo et al. 2007). Table 7 also reports bivariate 
correlations between unit nonresponse and selected covariates measured at baseline separately 
for marginal failers and marginal passers (Columns 1 and 2 for phase 3 and Columns 4 and 5 for 
phase 4). The evidence generally suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
underlying selection processes for nonresponse for both marginal failers and marginal passers are 
random.  Based  on  these  collective  findings,  we  assume  that  the  nonresponse  rate  is  locally 
smooth in the assignment variable at the cutoff.  
 
Sample  
Table 8 presents statistics on the distribution of schools by selected characteristics measured at 
baseline,  separately  by  phase  and  for  the  SLQAT  and  cutoff  neighborhood  samples.  We 
highlight two patterns. First, across both phases and samples, the distributional patterns across 
characteristics  are  broadly  comparable.  For example, the majority of schools are (1) middle 
schools (63–72%), (2) coeducational (82–87%), (3) officially-registered (81–88%) and (4) rural 
(53–59%).  Second,  comparing  the  phase-3  SLQAT  sample  to  the  phase-4  SLQAT  sample 
(Columns 1–3), pairwise t-tests of the equality of proportions show significant differences in the 28 
 
distribution of schools across several characteristics. It appears that, among other things, the 
shares of secondary schools, single-sex schools, urban schools, and registered schools are larger 
in  the  phase-3  SLQAT  sample  than  in  the  phase-4  SLQAT  sample.  These  distributional 
differences across phases lose their statistical significance when we restrict our attention to the 
cutoff  neighborhood  samples  (Columns  4–6).  Some  part  of  the  explanation  for  the  loss  in 
significance is likely due to reduced statistical power resulting from the smaller sample sizes for 
the cutoff neighborhood samples relative to the SLQAT samples.  
Table  9  presents  means  and  standard  deviations  for  selected  outcomes  measured  at 
baseline, again separately by phase and for the SLQAT and cutoff neighborhood samples. In the 
phase-3 SLQAT sample (Column 1), we find that schools on average have 253 students; 10 
teachers,  classrooms,  and  blackboards;  and  3  toilets.  Mean  student-teacher  and  student-
classrooms ratios are 25:1 and 28:1, respectively, which, to begin with, are below the stipulated 
maximums  for  program  benefit  maintenance.  The  differences  across  phases  in  the  SQLAT 
samples (Columns 1–3) lose their statistical significance when we restrict our attention to the 
cutoff neighborhood samples (Columns 4–6). Again, some part of the explanation for the loss in 
significance is likely to be the lower statistical power of the cutoff neighborhood samples relative 
to the SLQAT samples. Notwithstanding, the sizes of the inter-phase differences in the cutoff 
neighborhood samples are generally substantially smaller than the corresponding differences in 
the SLQAT samples. In sum, the phase-3 and phase-4 cutoff neighborhood samples appear to be 
similarly composed with respect to mean outcomes measured at baseline. 
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6.  Results 
Before presenting our RD estimates of the impacts of the FAS program, we discuss results from 
a couple of model specification tests. First, we show that there is a discontinuous change in the 
conditional probability of treatment at the SLQAT pass rate cutoff, as the suitability of the RD 
model hinges on this feature of the data. Second, we examine whether the density function of the 
SLQAT pass rate exhibits local smoothness at the cutoff. This test is particularly useful if data 
are unavailable to directly test whether the conditional mean untreated outcomes at the cutoff 
exhibit local smoothness. However, in our case, we can directly test the identifying condition for 
the RD design by using our baseline data on outcomes. Thus, we perform the density test mainly 
to check whether the result of this test is consistent with the result of the test of the identifying 
condition.  
 
Discontinuity in the probability of treatment at the cutoff 
Figure 3 plots the local linear regression functions estimated separately above and below the 
cutoff, separately for the phase-3 and phase-4 cutoff neighborhood schools with follow-up data 
on, among other things, program participation status (the optimal bandwidth is six percentage 
points for both samples). The jump in the probability of treatment is clearly visible for both 
samples. For the phase-3 sample, as expected, the probability of treatment is one above the cutoff 
and  positive  but  less  than  one  below  (with  42%  of  marginal  failers  in  phase  3  gaining 
participation status in phase 4). Furthermore, we observe that the probability of treatment is 
increasing as we approach the cutoff from below. A plausible and likely explanation for this 
pattern is that phase-3 marginal failers closer to the cutoff have a greater chance of passing the 
phase-4 SLQAT and entering the program than marginal failers farther away. For the phase-4 30 
 
sample, as expected, the probability of treatment jumps discontinuously from zero to one at the 
cutoff. These patterns in the conditional probabilities of treatment motivate our selections of 
partially-fuzzy and sharp RD designs for the phase-3 and phase-4 SLQAT samples, respectively.  
 
Local smoothness in the density function of SLQAT pass rates 
Rejection of local smoothness in the density function of the assignment variable at the cutoff 
may  suggest  manipulation  of  the  assignment  variable  z  (McCrary  2008).  Manipulation  is 
plausible  in  our case as  the  SLQAT  pass  rate cutoff for program  participation was  advance 
public knowledge, and schools and perhaps even program managers may have an interest in a 
particular treatment outcome. The pass rate that the school actually received on the SLQAT may 
be subject to partial manipulation, which is typically benign.
25 However, PEF staff exercise full 
control over the calculation of SLQAT pass rates, as well as their reporting, thus, introducing the 
risk of complete manipulation.
26 Given that we use SLQAT pass rates calculated by us based on 
the individual student test score data as our measure of the assignment variable , and these 
calculations nearly always match the pass rates calculated by PEF , manipulation would have to 
occur  at  the  individual  student  level.  Manipulation  at  this  level  is  less  straightforward; 
nonetheless, we cannot rule out the possibility.  
Figures 4 and 5 present frequency histograms of schools with bins equal to the integer 
values of SLQAT pass rates  for the SLQAT and cutoff nei ghborhood samples, respectively, 
separately by phase. A simple visual inspection of the SLQAT pass rates for both  the phase-3 
                                                 
25 The day the SLQAT is offered, the classes which are tested, and the specific SLQAT papers offered at the school 
are stochastic elements from the perspective of the school and outside its control.  
26 PEF staff may face incentives to manipulate the pass rates of marginal passers downwards (to just below the 
cutoff) if, for example, the program budget limits the number of schools that the program can be offered to. Given 
that  PEF  reports  that  they  were  flush  with  funds  during  this  period,  we  can  probably  discount  downward 
manipulation due to this reason. Alternatively, sympathetic PEF staff might manipulate the pass rate of marginal 
failers upwards (to just above the cutoff), so that these schools become eligible to participate in the program.  31 
 
and phase-4 samples suggests the presence of discontinuities in their densities in the immediate 
neighborhood  of  the  cutoff.  This  is  confirmed  by  formally  testing  for  discontinuities  in  the 
densities at the cutoff by applying a test proposed by McCrary (2008) involving separate kernel 
density estimations below and above the cutoff.
27 However, this pattern is not  unique to the 
cutoff location; the histograms show multiple sharp frequency peaks and troughs (at times, at 
adjacent pass rates) across the SLQAT pass rate support.  
 
Local smoothness in conditional mean outcomes at baseline 
As a direct test of the identifying assumption, we examine whether mean outcomes measured at 
baseline  satisfy  local  smoothness  at  the  cutoff  using  two  approaches:  by  (1)  examining 
differences  in  simple  means  between  marginal  failers  and  passers  for  alternative  cutoff 
neighborhood sizes and (2) estimating the discontinuity in the conditional means at the cutoff via 
local linear regressions at the selected alternative bandwidths. Table 10 presents the simple mean 
outcomes at baseline for marginal failers and differences from these means for marginal passers 
for two cutoff neighborhood sizes:  /   15 percentage points and  /   5 percentage points. The 
evidence suggests that, for both phase 3 and 4, by and large, there are no statistically-significant 
differences between marginal failers and passers in mean outcomes measured at baseline.  
Table 11 presents sharp RD estimates of baseline mean outcomes at the cutoff using local 
linear regressions, separately by phase and for the selected alternative bandwidths (the optimal 
bandwidth is four and three percentage points for the phase-3 and phase-4 cutoff neighborhood 
samples, respectively). In addition, Figures 6a–6c depict the estimated local linear regression 
functions  for  the  phase-3  and  phase-4  cutoff  neighborhood  samples,  using  their  respective 
optimal bandwidths. In general, the evidence suggests that we can reject local smoothness in 
                                                 
27 Results from the tests are available from the authors upon request. 32 
 
baseline mean outcomes at the cutoff more frequently than what our earlier simple comparisons 
of baseline mean outcomes between marginal failers and passers would have led us to state, as 
well  as  more  frequently  than  we  would  have  expected  by  random  chance  given  standard 
significance levels.  
Out  of  the  42  individually-estimated  RD  parameters  across  phases,  outcomes,  and 
selected  bandwidths,  seven  estimates  (17%)  are  statistically-significant.  Virtually  all  the 
statistically-significant RD estimates are negative in sign, suggesting that program schools tend 
to be smaller and have lower levels of inputs at baseline. The inference results are however not 
robust to the selected alternative bandwidths. Given this sensitivity in inference, we consider the 
results to generally satisfy the identifying condition. 
 
RD impact estimates  
Table 12 presents our RD impact estimates based on local linear regressions, separately by phase 
and for the selected alternative bandwidths (the optimal bandwidth is six and three percentage 
points for the phase-3 and phase-4 cutoff neighborhood samples, respectively). Figures 7a–b plot 
the estimated local linear regression functions using the optimal bandwidth choice for the phase-
4 cutoff neighborhood sample. 
For the phase-3 cutoff neighborhood sample (Columns 1–3), whose data are subject to a 
partially-fuzzy  RD  design,  we  find  no  evidence  of  significant  program  impacts  across  the 
outcomes of interest. The magnitudes of the impact estimates also appear to be sensitive to the 
selected alternative bandwidths. In addition, the empirical standard errors associated with the 
impact estimates are inordinately large, suggesting weak identification.  33 
 
For the phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample (Columns 4–6), whose data are subject to a 
sharp RD design, we find evidence of significant positive impacts on the number of students, 
teachers,  classrooms,  and  blackboards  in  marginal  passers;  furthermore,  their  significance  is 
robust  to  the  selected  alternative  bandwidths.  The  accompanying  figures  show  a  discernible 
structural change in the mean levels for these outcomes marginally above and below the cutoff. 
However, as with the partially-fuzzy RD estimates for the phase-3 cutoff neighborhood sample, 
the magnitudes of the impacts appear to be sensitive to bandwidth. In particular, the estimates 
drop fairly sharply when we increase the bandwidth from the optimal choice of 3 percentage 
points by 50% to 4.5 percentage points. The most conservative impact estimates at the cutoff on 
the  number  of  students,  teachers,  classrooms,  and  blackboards  are  85,  3.4,  4,  and  2.8, 
respectively.  Relative  to  the  baseline  means  for  these  outcomes  in  the  phase-4  cutoff 
neighborhood sample, the absolute impact estimates translate into percent impact estimates of 
roughly  37%,  37%,  47%  and  27%,  respectively.  These  impacts  are  substantial.  They  are 
particularly impressive given the short treatment exposure under investigation: the follow-up 
telephone interview data were collected only some ten months after phase-4 program schools 
received their first subsidy payment. 
Notwithstanding, we do not find evidence of impacts at the cutoff on the number of 
toilets and student-teacher and student-classroom ratios. This finding is robust to the selected 
alternative bandwidths. The lack of evidence of a positive effect on the number of toilets is 
concerning given the large expansion in enrollment in marginal passers and its potential negative 
bearing on the use and maintenance of the facility. The finding may reflect that PEF does not 
encourage the adequate provision of this facility to the same degree as the provision of other 
types  of  physical  infrastructure  (such  as  classrooms).  Given  the  expansion  in  enrollment  in 34 
 
marginal  passers,  the  absence  of  effects  on  the  ratios  suggests  that  program  schools  have 
expanded  the  number  of  teachers  and  classrooms  (which  we  find)  in  lock-step  with  this 
expansion. This behavior may be driven in large part by PEF’s condition that program schools 
maintain these ratios below stipulated levels.  
 
Falsification test: RD estimates at false cutoffs 
Table  13  presents  sharp  RD  estimates  for  our  outcomes  of  interest  based  on  local  linear 
regressions for the phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample at two arbitrarily-selected false cutoffs: 
57% and 77%. The false cutoffs are equidistant from the true cutoff of 67%. We expect to find 
local  smoothness  in the  conditional  mean  outcomes  at  these  cutoffs.  The  subsample  for  the 
investigation at 57% is schools with SLQAT pass rates between 52% and 66%. Likewise, the 
subsample for the investigation at 77% is schools with SLQAT pass rates between 67% and 
82%. The optimal bandwidths for the lower and upper samples are six and three percentage 
points,  respectively.  At  both  cutoffs,  the  evidence  suggests  that  we  cannot  reject  the  null 
hypothesis  of local  smoothness  in  the conditional mean  outcomes. The inference  results  are 
robust to the selected alternative bandwidths. 
 
Cost-effectiveness estimates 
We estimate the cost-effectiveness of the program in relation to enrollment gains using two 
alternative approaches. Using the conservative estimate of the sharp RD impact on enrollment 
for  the  phase-4  cutoff  neighborhood  sample  (85  students),  a  first  way  that  we  estimate  the 
program’s cost-effectiveness is by deriving the annual rupee cost of one additional student in a 
program school induced by the program. Given a baseline mean school size of 232 students for 35 
 
schools in the phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample (which we treat as the number of children 
that would have attended the program school in the absence of the treatment) and an annual 
subsidy  amount  of  3,600  rupees  (US$42.4)  per  student,
28  it costs 13,426 rupees   (=3,600
(232+85)/85) (US$157.7) to induce an additional student per year. In comparison, this cost is 
roughly  half  of  the  cost of  inducing  an  additional  student  per  year  through  conditional  cash 
transfers to female students in public secondary schools in Punjab (Andrabi et al. 2008a).  
Following  the  approach  by  Evans  and  Ghosh  (2008),  a second  way we calculate  the 
program’s cost-effectiveness is by deriving the annual per-student cost of increasing enrollment 
in program schools by 1%. Using an annual subsidy amount of 3,600 rupees per student and the 
sharp RD impact estimate on enrollment of 37%, we estimate a cost-effectiveness ratio of 97 
rupees (=3,600/37) (US$1.1). This estimate compares extremely favorably with the estimated 
cost-effective  ratios  of  other  evaluated  education  interventions  across  the  developing  world 
which generated enrollment gains as reported in Evans and Ghosh. In fact, the FAS program’s 
ratio ranks among the very lowest.
29 What is more, our cost-effectiveness estimate surprisingly 
neighbors  Evan  and  Ghosh’s  estimate  of  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  per-student  subsidy 
program in Balochistan, Pakistan evaluated by Kim et al. (1999) and noted in Section 1. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimate the causal effects of the FAS program, a recently-instituted public 
subsidy program to low-cost private schools, in the province of Punjab, Pakistan on student 
enrollment and schooling inputs. Our findings on the impacts of the program differ by phase. For 
                                                 
28 The annual subsidy amount per student is roughly equal to the annual program amount per student, as the per-
student amounts for program administrative costs and the teacher and school bonuses add less than 1% to the 
amount. This is principally due to the large number of students currently covered under the program.  
29  This  result  remains  qualitatively  unaltered  if  we  precisely  follow  the  currency  conversion  and  inflation 
adjustments steps taken by Evans and Ghosh to fix all ratios in 1997 US dollars.  36 
 
phase-3 SLQAT takers, applying a partially-fuzzy RD design, we find no evidence of program 
impacts  at  the  cutoff  on  our  outcomes  of  interest.  We  posit  that  this  is  likely  due  to  weak 
identification arising from a small jump in the probability of treatment at the cutoff. In contrast, 
for  phase-4  SLQAT  takers,  applying  a  sharp  RD  design,  we  find  robust  evidence  that  the 
program significantly increased the number of students, teachers, classrooms, and blackboards in 
marginal passers. The impact estimates at the cutoff were sizeable: our conservative estimates 
indicate that the program expanded marginal passers by roughly 85 students, and 3–4 teachers, 
classrooms, and blackboards. These impact estimates are also large relative to the mean baseline 
values for these outcomes for phase-4 SLQAT takers near the cutoff. What is more, they are 
particularly  impressive  given  that  phase-4  program  schools  were  exposed  to  only  about  ten 
months of treatment before the follow-up telephone interview data were gathered. Finally, our 
cost-effectiveness  estimates  suggest  that the program  is  among  the cheapest  interventions in 
developing countries for inducing enrollment gains.  
Two potential threats to the internal validity of our impact estimates are however present. 
These threats arise from specific design and implementation features of the program. The first 
threat is program spillovers to non-program schools (of which marginal failers are but a specific 
subset) that operate in the same local schooling markets as program schools. Design features of 
the program such as the free-schooling condition for program benefit maintenance can alter the 
terms of local market competition, providing program schools with a competitive edge vis-à-vis 
non-program schools. The altered terms could result in impact estimates being upwardly biased 
if, for example, they induce the flow of students (and accompanying them, teachers) from non-
program to program schools leading to the shrinking (or, at an extreme, the shutdown) of non-
program schools and/or they discourage investments in the quantity and quality of inputs. On the 37 
 
other hand, the altered terms could result in impact estimates being downwardly biased if they 
induce  non-program  schools  to  adapt  to  more  effectively  compete  in  the  new  local  market 
environment created by the program such as by ratcheting up their investments in the quantity 
and quality of inputs and/or altering their fee structures to retain their existing student bodies and 
attract new students. Both types of effects could be present simultaneously; consequently, the 
direction of the net effect is theoretically ambiguous.  
The second threat arises from anticipation of future treatment. Program entry is not a one-
off event. To date, there have five calls for applications over a three-year period. Given this 
pattern, it is conceivable that non-program schools interested in joining the program might alter 
their behavior in anticipation of a future call for applications and in an effort to increase the 
likelihood of program entry. These actions could, for example, take the form of non-program 
schools investing in more and better quality inputs and resources. Anticipation in this case would 
result in impact estimates being downwardly biased. In particular, behavioral changes due to 
anticipation might be most applicable to non-program schools who just failed to achieve the 
SLQAT pass rate cutoff in an earlier phase of entry (our marginal failers), as we would expect 
that the marginal costs of investments and efforts required for failers from a previous phase to 
gain program entry are likely to be decreasing as one approaches the cutoff from below. 
While when the RD model is applied to the right data designs, it yields internally-valid 
estimates, the generalizability of these impact estimates is likely to be limited as they are in 
principle only valid for narrowly-defined subpopulations. In the case of the phase-4 SLQAT 
taker data, which are fitted using a sharp design, the RD impact estimates are valid for low-cost 
private schools that successfully applied to the program, cleared the physical inspection, and 
obtained pass rates near the SLQAT cutoff. Even if we generalize our estimated treatment effects 38 
 
to  be  average  treatment  effects  over  the  full  range  of  SLQAT  pass  rates,  the  further 
generalizability of the estimated effects is limited by sample selection, as the SLQAT pass rate is 
only available for low-cost private schools in the seven main program districts that learned about 
the call for applications, applied to the program, passed the inspection screening, and took the 
SLQAT. This group of schools may not be representative of the population of low-cost private 
schools in the program districts, leave alone the population of low-cost private schools more 
widely. Given what we know about the steps that precede taking the SLQAT, the extent to which 
the  population  of  SLQAT  takers  diverges  from  the  broader  population  of  low-cost  private 
schools  in  the  program  districts  is  largely  determined  by  how  demanding  PEF’s  physical 
inspection screening is. Evidently, this screening has bite: as mentioned before, only 75% and 
61% of schools that were inspected by PEF cleared it and took the SLQAT in phases 3 and 4, 
respectively.  39 
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Table 1. Selected education statistics for Pakistan and Punjab province, 1998/99 and 2004/05 
Sample 
 
1998/99  2004/05  % change,  
1998/99–2004/05 
Pakistan  Punjab  Pakistan  Punjab  Pakistan  Punjab 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel 1: School participation rate, ages 6–15 years 
All  51.6  54.2  60.9  65.7  18.1  21.2 
Rural   45.3  48.9  54.6  60.9  20.5  24.5 
Female  43.0  48.1  53.7  61.2  24.7  27.3 
Poorest quintile  30.2  32.6  45.0  48.7  49.1  49.4 
              Panel 2: Public school participation rate, ages 6–15 years 
All  38.8  39.0  43.7  45.5  12.5  16.9 
Rural   38.7  40.0  44.7  47.4  15.5  18.5 
Female  31.6  33.7  37.6  42.0  18.7  24.8 
Poorest quintile  27.2  28.5  39.3  41.1  44.5  44.2 
              Panel 3: Private school participation rate, ages 6–15 years 
All  11.2  13.5  15.8  18.5  40.7  37.4 
Rural   5.2  7.4  8.7  12.1  66.9  64.8 
Female  10.2  13.0  14.9  17.8  45.2  36.9 
Poorest quintile  2.0  2.9  4.5  6.4  119.2  120.2 
              Notes: Statistics for Pakistan actually represent statistics for the four provinces of Pakistan (unit data for the 
territories  were  not  available).  All  statistics  are  corrected  for  sampling  weights.  The  selected  age  group  for 
measuring participation (ages 6–15 years) is one year removed from the official ages for primary and secondary 
schooling (ages 5–14 years) as this range is more consistent with when children typically attend school. The 
private and public school participation rates do not necessarily added up to the school participation rate as school 
participation also includes religious and NGO/community school participation, with are treated as separate school 
types. 
Data  sources:  1998/99  Pakistan  Integrated  Household  Survey  (PIHS);  2004/05  Pakistan  Social  and  Living 
Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM). Fieldwork for the 2004/05 PSLM was conducted between September 
2004 and March 2005, preceding the FAS program start date. 
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Table 2. FAS program timeline   
Phase 1 application deadline  October 2005 
Phase 1 school agreements signed  November 2005–January 2006 (52/54) 
Phase 1 first monthly subsidy payment  January 2006 
QAT 1  March–April 2006 
Phase 2 application deadline  June 2006 
Phase 2 school agreements signed  September–December 2006 (143/150) 
Phase 2 first monthly subsidy payment  October 2006 
QAT 2  October–November 2006 
First payment of annual teacher bonus  January 2007 
QAT 3  March–April 2007 
Phase 3 application deadline   April 2007 
Phase 3 school agreements signed  July–August 2007 (473/482) 
Phase 3 first monthly subsidy payment  August 2007 
Phase 4 application deadline   July 2007 
QAT 4  October–November 2007 
Phase 4 school agreements signed   November 2007 (424/424) 
Phase 4 first monthly subsidy payment   December 2007 
Second payment of annual teacher bonus  February 2008 
First payment of annual school bonus  February 2008 
QAT 5  March–April 2008 
Phase 5 application deadline  April 2008 
Notes: The statistics in parentheses represent the number of schools that signed agreements in those months relative 
to the number of schools that entered the program in that phase. 43 
 
 
Table 3. District- and phase-wise frequency distribution of FAS program schools  
District  Adult literacy rate (10+ years)  Adult literacy rate rank 
(Low number = high rank) 
Phase   
1  2  3  4  Total 
Rawalpindi   78  1                
Lahore   70 
a  2  7  11      18 
Sialkot   70  3  7  9      16 
Chakwal  69  4  9  17      26 
Jhelum   68  5           
Gujranwala   67  6           
Gujrat  65  7    15      15 
Faisalabad   60  8           
Narowal  60  9    6      6 
Sargodha   58  10           
Toba Tek Singh  58  11           
Attock  57  12           
Mandi Bahauddin  57  13           
Mianwali  56  14    12      12 
Hafizabad  55  15           
Sahiwal  54  16           
Khushab  52  17  10  19      29 
Sheikhupura  50  18  2        2 
Khanewal  49  19           
Jhang  47  20      44  48  92 
Layyah  46  21           
Multan   46  22      58  80  138 
Bahawalnagar  44  23    14  115  43  172 
Okara  43  24           
Vehari  43  25    1      1 
Kasur  42  26           
Pakpattan  42  27           
Rahim Yar Khan  42  28           
D. G. Khan  40  29           
Bahawalpur   37  30  10  16  114  88  228 
Bhakkar  37  31    11      11 
Lodhran  37  32      42  49  91 
Muzaffargarh  36  33    1  72  81  154 
Rajanpur  34  34      35  35  70 
Nankana Sahib
b  --  --    1      1 
Number of districts   6  13  7  7  18 
Number of program schools (as of June 2008)  45  133  480  424  1082 
               
         High presence     
         Low presence     
          Bold  Program district      
Notes: District-level adult literacy rates obtained from Government of Punjab (2004) based on data from the 2003-04 Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS). 
bThe literacy rate for Nankana Sahib 
was unavailable. 
aThe statistic for Lahore district is a simple mean of the literacy rates for towns and cantonments in Lahore.  44 
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Table 4. FAS program coverage of private schools in selected program districts 
Program district 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Number of program 
schools 
Number of primary, 
middle and secondary 
private schools 
Program share 
Bahawalnagar  172     447  0.38 
Bahawalpur  230     871  0.26 
Jhang   93     686  0.14 
Lodhran   93     284  0.33 
Multan  139  1,411  0.10 
Muzaffargarh  157     690  0.23 
Rajanpur    71     226  0.31 
Total  955  4,615  0.21 
Notes: Numbers of private schools provided by Corinne Siaens using the 2005 National Education Census (NEC) 
data. Column (2) reports numbers of relevant schools strictly classified as private in the NEC. 
 
 
Table 5. Mean characteristics of FAS program schools 
Characteristic  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3  Phase 4  All phases 
Total number of students  561.40  547.42  373.83  241.66  351.18 
           
Level           
Primary  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.11  0.07 
Middle  0.24  0.31  0.60  0.69  0.59 
Secondary  0.73  0.65  0.35  0.20  0.34 
           
Gender type           
Coeducational  0.69  0.86  0.83  0.82  0.83 
Girls-only  0.20  0.11  0.09  0.11  0.11 
Boys-only  0.11  0.03  0.07  0.07  0.07 
           
Registration status           
Registered  0.91  0.97  0.89  0.81  0.87 
Unregistered  0.09  0.03  0.11  0.19  0.13 
           
Location           
Urban  0.36  0.45  0.48  0.42  0.45 
Rural  0.64  0.55  0.52  0.58  0.55 
           
N  45  133  480  424  1,082 
Notes: The statistics exclude the three higher secondary schools that are program schools. The statistics are 
constructed from administrative data from September 2008, one month before the follow-up data collection.  
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Met application 
requirements
Passed physical 
inspection
Passed 
SLQAT
Joined FAS 
program
Phase 3: 1,070 799 514 482
Phase 4: 1,430 872 431 425
Figure 2. Numbers of schools which cleared the different FAS program entry steps  
 
 
Table 6. FAS program school participation status, by phase 
Phase 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Entrants  Disqualified, 
all reasons 
Disqualified, 
double QAT failure 
Current 
participation 
1       54    9    7       45 
2     150  16  13     133 
3     482    2    0     480 
4     425    1    0     424 
Total  1,111  28  20  1,082 
Notes: Disqualification also includes voluntary exits. Statistics reflect program school participation status at the 
time of the follow-up data collection in October 2008. 
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Table 7. Correlates of nonresponse in follow-up telephone interview data 
  Phase-3 cutoff neighborhood sample  Phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Marginal 
failers 
Marginal 
passers  All  Marginal 
failers 
Marginal 
passers  All 
Panel A: Nonresponse counts and rates 
Number of nonresponses  29  47  76  26  45  71 
Nonresponse rate  0.27  0.29  0.28  0.20  0.24  0.22 
             
Panel B: Bivariate correlation estimates 
Above cutoff  --  --  0.03  --  --  0.04 
      (0.06)      (0.05) 
Baseline characteristics             
Registered  –0.14  0.01  –0.04  –0.06  0.00  –0.01 
  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Coeducational  0.06  –0.03  0.01  –0.03  –0.10  –0.06 
  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Girls-only  –0.10  0.19  0.07  0.03  0.05  0.02 
  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Boys-only  0.07  –0.31***  –0.19  0.03  0.15  0.10 
  (0.27)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.11) 
Primary  –0.02  0.27*  0.15  0.26*  0.10  0.15* 
  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.08) 
Middle  –0.12  0.00  –0.05  –0.21**  –0.10  –0.14** 
  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Secondary  0.16  –0.10  0.00  0.12  0.07  0.09 
  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Urban  0.01  –0.12*  –0.07  0.07  –0.05  0.00 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Rural  –0.01  0.12*  0.07  –0.07  0.05  0.00 
  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Bahawalnagar  –0.01  –0.07  –0.05  0.09  –0.08  –0.01 
  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Bahawalpur  –0.12  0.01  –0.05  0.18*  –0.02  0.06 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Jhang  –0.21*  0.05  0.13  0.06  0.00  0.01 
  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
Lodhran  0.07  –0.17*  –0.09  0.00  –0.14**  –0.07 
  (0.20)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Multan  –0.14  0.11  0.00  –0.18**  0.02  –0.06 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Muzaffargarh  0.03  0.11  0.08  –0.18  0.05  –0.05 
  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.09)**  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Rajanpur  0.07  –0.13  –0.05  0.16  0.14  0.14 
  (0.20)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.09) 
N  108  160  268  128  191  319 
Notes:  *  denotes  statistical  significance  at  the  10%  level;  **  at  the  5%  level;  and  ***  at  the  1%  level. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 8. Distribution of schools by selected characteristics at baseline, SLQAT and cutoff 
neighborhood samples 
Characteristic 
SLQAT sample 
  0,100 z  
Cutoff neighborhood sample 
  52,82 z  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Phase 3 
Share 
Phase 4 
Share 
Diff. 
(1)–(2) 
Phase 3 
Share 
Phase 4 
Share 
Diff. 
(4)–(5) 
Level             
Primary  0.09  0.12  –0.02  0.07  0.12  –0.05 
Middle  0.63  0.72  –0.09***  0.71  0.70  0.01 
Secondary  0.28  0.16  0.12***  0.22  0.18  0.04 
             
Gender type             
Coeducational  0.82  0.87  –0.05***  0.87  0.86  0.01 
Girls-only  0.12  0.08  0.03**  0.10  0.09  0.01 
Boys-only  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.04  0.06  –0.02 
             
Registration status             
Registered  0.88  0.81  0.07***  0.88  0.83  0.05* 
Unregistered  0.12  0.19  –0.07***  0.12  0.17  –0.05* 
             
Location type             
Urban  0.45  0.41  0.04*  0.47  0.41  0.06 
Rural  0.54  0.59  –0.04*  0.53  0.59  –0.06 
             
District             
Bahawalnagar  0.21  0.11  0.10***  0.20  0.09  0.11*** 
Bahawalpur  0.24  0.20  0.04**  0.25  0.21  0.04 
Jhang  0.13  0.11  0.02  0.14  0.14  0.00 
Lodhran  0.08  0.12  –0.04***  0.07  0.09  –0.02 
Multan  0.13  0.16  –0.03*  0.13  0.20  –0.07** 
Muzaffargarh  0.14  0.20  –0.05***  0.14  0.17  –0.03 
Rajanpur  0.07  0.10  –0.03*  0.06  0.09  –0.03 
             
N  747  830  --  268  319  -- 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 9. Summary statistics of outcome measures at baseline, SLQAT and cutoff neighborhood samples 
Outcome measure 
SLQAT sample 
  0,100 z  
Cutoff neighborhood sample 
  52,82 z  
(1) 
Phase 3 
(2) 
Phase 4 
(3) 
(2)–(1) 
(4) 
Phase 3 
(5) 
Phase 4 
(6) 
(5)–(4) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Difference 
(SE) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Difference 
(SE) 
Number of students  252.85  222.63  –30.22***  240.82  232.27  –8.56 
  (155.70)  (106.68)  (6.79)  (134.67)   (108.05)   (10.21)  
Number of teachers  10.22  9.00  –1.22***  9.82  9.32  –0.50 
  (5.03)  (3.69)  (0.22)  (4.30)   (3.77)   (0.34)  
Number of classrooms  9.56  8.43  –1.13***  8.90  8.59  –0.31 
  (4.71)  (3.82)  (0.22)  (3.78)   (3.76)   (0.31)  
Number of blackboards  9.93  9.03  –0.90***  9.39  9.27  –0.11 
  (5.03)  (4.00)  (0.23)  (4.11)   (3.93)   (0.33)  
Number of toilets  3.23  2.95  –0.28***  3.09  2.97  –0.12 
  (1.80)  (1.94)  (0.09)  (1.59)   (1.75)   (0.14)  
Student-teacher ratio  25.06  25.67  0.60  24.98  25.59  0.60 
  (9.27)  (9.51)  (0.47)  (9.59)   (8.26)   (0.75)  
Student-classroom ratio  27.51  28.13  0.62  28.30  28.35  0.05 
  (12.63)  (12.13)  (0.63)  (13.99)   (11.47)   (1.07)  
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. SD denotes standard deviation; SE standard error; and z 
the treatment assignment variable, the SLQAT pass rate.  50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability of treatment, cutoff neighborhood sample, by phase 
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Figure 4. Frequency histogram of SLQAT pass rates, SLQAT sample, by phase 
 
 
   
 
Figure 5. Frequency histogram of SLQAT pass rates, cutoff neighborhood sample, by phase 
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Table 10. Differences in mean outcomes at baseline between SLQAT marginal passers and marginal failers 
Outcome measure 
Phase-3 cutoff neighborhood sample  Phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample 
  52,82 z     62,72 z     52,82 z     62,72 z  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Marginal 
failers 
Marginal 
passers 
Marginal 
failers 
Marginal 
passers 
Marginal 
failers 
Marginal 
passers 
Marginal 
failers 
Marginal 
passers 
Mean 
(SD) 
Diff. 
(SE) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Diff. 
(SE) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Diff. 
(SE) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Diff. 
(SE) 
Number of students  242.32  –2.52  268.50  –48.17  229.68  4.33  254.83  –28.01 
  (138.80)   (16.78)   (188.03)   (34.82)   (99.26)   (12.36)   (114.57)   (20.60)  
Number of teachers  9.91  –0.15  9.82  –0.79  9.23  0.14  9.80  –0.63 
  (4.22)   (0.54)   (5.41)   (1.08)   (3.36)   (0.43)   (4.03)   (0.71)  
Number of classrooms  8.88  0.04  8.41  0.01  8.53  0.10  9.61  –1.22* 
  (3.83)   (0.47)   (4.10)   (0.80)   (3.83)   (0.43)   (4.12)   (0.68)  
Number of blackboards  9.29  0.16  8.74  –0.02  9.17  0.18  10.22  –1.16 
  (4.10)   (0.51)   (4.59)   (0.93)   (3.72)   (0.45)   (4.34)   (0.73)  
Number of toilets  3.08  0.01  2.74  0.23  2.98  –0.03  3.37  –0.32 
  (1.66)   (0.20)   (1.83)   (0.36)   (1.74)   (0.20)   (2.44)   (0.43)  
Student-teacher ratio  24.67  0.53  25.95  –0.53  25.48  0.18  26.57  –1.10 
  (9.28)   (1.19)   (8.10)   (2.33)   (7.90)   (0.94)   (7.32)   (1.52)  
Student-classroom ratio  28.69  –0.66  31.97  –4.87  28.18  0.28  27.44  1.55 
  (13.58)   (1.74)   (15.61)   (3.26)   (10.69)   (1.32)   (8.77)   (2.32)  
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. z denotes the treatment assignment variable, the SLQAT 
pass rate; SD standard deviation; and SE standard error. 
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Table 11. Local smoothness in conditional mean outcomes at baseline 
Local linear regression with triangular kernel and bandwidth h  
Outcome measure 
Phase-3 cutoff neighborhood sample  Phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
4% pts h   6% pts h   8% pts h   3% pts h   4.5% pts h   6% pts h  
Number of students  –97.05  14.32  –39.12  –78.43  –132.88**  –107.76** 
  (140.67)  (88.06)  (60.96)  (92.74)  (65.79)  (51.50) 
Number of teachers  –0.72  1.35  –0.59  4.37*  –1.41  –1.78 
  (3.56)  (2.57)  (1.75)  (2.51)  (3.26)  (2.08) 
Number of classrooms  0.31  1.78  0.61  2.43  –2.17  –2.44 
  (3.24)  (2.23)  (1.57)  (2.04)  (2.72)  (1.77) 
Number of blackboards  –0.74  1.71  0.69  0.67  –2.98  –2.95* 
  (3.24)  (2.13)  (1.56)  (1.73)  (2.30)  (1.73) 
Number of toilets  1.36  1.45*  0.93  –1.32  –2.13  –2.19* 
  (1.24)  (0.74)  (0.61)  (1.65)  (1.56)  (1.25) 
Student-teacher ratio  –8.53  –1.37  –0.15  –22.37*  –11.91  –8.70 
  (8.52)  (4.15)  (3.39)  (11.98)  (8.20)  (5.46) 
Student-classroom ratio  –14.37  –3.80  –4.19  –12.26  –5.73  –3.12 
  (12.67)  (7.14)  (5.69)  (9.49)  (7.28)  (5.85) 
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are 
reported in parentheses. 54 
 
 
1.  Number of students 
   
 
2.  Number of teachers 
   
 
3.  Number of classrooms 
   
 
Figure 6a. Local smoothness in conditional mean outcomes at baseline, by phase 
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4.  Number of blackboards 
   
 
5.  Number of toilets 
   
 
6.  Student-teacher ratio 
   
 
Figure 6b. Local smoothness in conditional mean outcomes at baseline, by phase 
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7.  Student-classroom ratio 
   
 
Figure 6c. Local smoothness in conditional mean outcomes at baseline, by phase 
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Table 12. Discontinuity estimates of conditional mean outcomes 
Local linear regression with triangular kernel and bandwidth h 
Outcome measure 
Phase-3 cutoff neighborhood sample 
Partially-fuzzy RD estimates 
Phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample 
Sharp RD estimates 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
6% pts h   9% pts h   12% pts h   3% pts h   4.5% pts h   6% pts h  
Number of students  180.3  –29.03  –28.03  122.66***  85.20**  88.84** 
  (8.09e+14)   (18002.95)   (6230.31)   (45.75)   (42.77)   (41.32)  
Number of teachers  6.46  3.34  3.09  5.07**  3.39*  3.46* 
  (3.96e+13)   (331.89)   (42.19)   (2.35)   (1.92)   (1.82)  
Number of classrooms  2.63  –0.75  1.43  9.85**  4.55*  4.00** 
  (1.77e+13)   (121.08)   (95.78)   (3.89)   (2.38)   (2.02)  
Number of blackboards  --  --  --  6.56**  3.14*  2.83* 
        (2.71)   (1.85)   (1.72)  
Number of toilets  --  --  --  0.07  –0.37  –0.14 
        (1.28)   (0.95)   (0.85)  
Student-teacher ratio  0.39  –6.17  –5.07  1.23  –0.85  –1.04 
  (97.98)   (86.51)   (114.35)   (3.97)   (2.77)   (2.54)  
Student-classroom ratio  11.48  1.45  –4.77  –29.18  –11.39  –8.12 
  (88.45)   (131.10)   (59.86)   (22.29)   (9.89)   (7.24)  
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are 
reported in parentheses.  58 
 
 
1.  Number of students 
 
2.  Number of teachers 
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5.  Number of toilets 
 
 
 
Figure 7a. Local discontinuities in conditional mean outcomes, phase 4 
   
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
SLQAT student pass rate
School observations LLR smoother for SLQAT failers
LLR smoother for SLQAT passers
Phase 4
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
e
a
c
h
e
r
s
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
SLQAT student pass rate
School observations LLR smoother for SLQAT failers
LLR smoother for SLQAT passers
Phase 4
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
c
l
a
s
s
r
o
o
m
s
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
SLQAT student pass rate
School observations LLR smoother for SLQAT failers
LLR smoother for SLQAT passers
Phase 4
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
b
l
a
c
k
b
o
a
r
d
s
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
SLQAT student pass rate
School observations LLR smoother for SLQAT failers
LLR smoother for SLQAT passers
Phase 4
0
5
1
0
1
5
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
t
o
i
l
e
t
s
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
SLQAT student pass rate
School observations LLR smoother for SLQAT failers
LLR smoother for SLQAT passers
Phase 459 
 
 
6.  Student-teacher ratio 
 
7.  Student-classroom ratio 
 
 
Figure 7b. Local discontinuities in conditional mean outcomes, phase 4 
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Table 13. Discontinuity estimates of conditional mean outcomes at false cutoffs, phase-4 cutoff neighborhood sample 
Local linear regression with triangular kernel and bandwidth h 
Outcome measure 
Cutoff = 57%  Cutoff = 77% 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
7% pts h    10.5% pts h    14% pts h    4% pts h    6% pts h    8% pts h   
Number of students  –21.38  –18.77  –18.59  57.99  8.42  9.86 
  (48.84)   (47.11)   (47.28)   (122.09)   (85.87)   (72.00)  
Number of teachers  –1.21  –1.02  –0.99  3.80  2.11  2.00 
  (1.79)   (1.65)   (1.65)   (3.70)   (2.69)   (2.35)  
Number of classrooms  –1.74  –1.69  –1.67  2.39  –0.30  –0.05 
  (1.84)   (1.61)   (1.58)   (3.57)   (2.58)   (2.10)  
Number of blackboards  0.95  0.29  0.14  –1.81  –2.64  –2.85 
  (3.70)   (3.52)   (3.50)   (3.23)   (2.23)   (1.92)  
Number of toilets  2.91  2.38  2.12  0.56  1.38  0.78 
  (4.46)   (4.08)   (4.00)   (3.73)   (2.65)   (2.38)  
Student-teacher ratio  –2.46  –2.49  –2.50  2.21  0.06  0.21 
  (2.28)   (2.13)   (2.11)   (4.10)   (2.78)   (2.30)  
Student-classroom ratio  –0.21  –0.32  –0.36  1.51  –0.40  –0.64 
  (0.79)   (0.76)   (0.76)   (1.76)   (1.40)   (1.14)  
Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; and *** at the 1% level. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications are 
reported in parentheses.  The subsample  for the investigation at 57% is  schools  with  pass rates between 52% and 66%. Similarly, the subsample for the 
investigation at 77% is schools with pass rates between 67% and 82%. 
 